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Than They Really Are should reach to the raids of the

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WASHINGTON, Oct 5-John Mc Cone, the head man at the Central Some men in State thought a major Intelligence Agency, is discovering in Vietnam, as his predecessor, Allen Dulles, did in Cuba, that running a secret service for a big, gabby country is a very dicy business.

He is now accused publicly of differing with his Government's policy in Salgon, which he denies, and he takes the whole controversy so seriously that he has convinced himself that there is a conspiracy inside the Government and in the press to destroy his agency.

This is a serious thing if true, for the cold war is in part a war of insurgency and counter-insurgency, and in such a war an effective secret service is increasingly important. But so far as can be determined here, there is no evidence McCone's Sensitivity of any conspiracy either by or against the C.I.A. in Vietnam.

An Old Dispute

between the C.I.A. and the State and Defense Departments. There always has been. State has always been afraid C.I.A. would not restrict itself to the gathering of intelligence C.I.A. to see whether C.I.A.'s inbut would go beyond that to in-felligence would show that such a terpret their intelligence in such a

Similarly, the Defense Department has always been afraid the C.I.A. would get into the field of actual operations, as it did in Cuba. Thus, State and Defense, jealous of that McCone should be so surprised their policy and operations functions, respectively, have always been suspicious of C.I.A. and prone to complain to the press whenever they think they see evidence of encroachment.

pressed in the first Cuban crisis. Cuba, and it is likely to get all the They have been heard again about more suspicious when the spooks Vietnam, but the analogy with Cuba see a great conspiracy in the reis misleading.

No doubt McCone and his head man in Saigon, John H. Richardson, who has now been called home, have strong views about both policy and operations in Vietnam. It would be surprising if they didn't.

The C.I.A. was deeply involved in Vietnam long before the 14,000 U.S. troops were sent there. The C.I.A. helped train the Vietnamese army. And they were already close to! President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, before President Kennedy made his decision that a major be launched in Vietnam.

temples were taided starting the present crisis, the C.L.A. State and Defense officials were not only operating in Salgon but were doubly How to Make Things Worse, involved emotionally, and had dire

> The differing views, however, hid not always follow the party line of the three government agencies. changes in the policies and personnel of the Diem Government. Others thought that while such changes were desirable, they could not be forced without weakening the war effort. But these conflicting views existed within all three agencies, including the C.I.A. in Saigon, and President Kennedy himself first supported the first line and then the


This was not, then, an Alfred Hitchcock spectacular involving the C.I.A. vs. the Rest. It was an honest difference over whether a purge of he Diem Government was possible and whether such a purge would or would not help the war effort.

The State Department, for example, against the judgment of some of its own people but with: There is a jurisdictional dispute the support of most of its top ofsupport of trying to force a change in the Diem Government,

it did not check this out with purge could be forced. Nor did it tell way as to influence or make policy. the Defense Department about the directive. So C.I.A. and Defense. which in general were not for trying the purge, were not amused:

What is surprising about all this is and tender about the criticism and the belated efforts of the White House to tidy things up.

This country is always going to be suspicious of any government secret These feelings were savagely service agency, especially after porting of their activities.



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